Move Your Shadow. 6 On the major homelands of Lebowa (pop. 2 million) and KaNgwane (pop: 550,000) one cannot find anything at all.
Empirical neglect has been parallelled by analytical neglect, so that one is hard put to find more than one theoretical article in the past decade on any aspect of the homelands. The one article is Johan Graaff,"Towards an understanding of bantustan politics," in The Political Economy of South Africa, Ed. N.Nattrass and E.Ardington (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990) .
Africa.' Less dramatic certainly, but equally galling to the South African government, was the behaviour of six other homeland leaders who pulled out of important talks scheduled with President F.W. de Klerk in April 1990, at the ANC's behest.
These events have made a mockery of the conventional wisdom that the homelands are far too economically dependent on the South African government to turn against it. It is a lesson that the government itself has been quick to absorb. As late as 1987, they were still attempting to force 'independence' down the throat of KwaNdebele. By August 1991, however, the National Party Congress concluded that the homeland policy should be abandoned. The context of this announcement implies that this volte-face was less a spontaneous concession than a retreat in the face of the collapse of the homeland system. It could even be argued that this collapse was one of the major considerations which prompted the "reform" initiatives of President de Klerk.
It is naturally impossible for me to give a comprehensive account of the entire collapse within the limits of a single paper.
My object is the more modest one of relating the hitherto uncompiled history of the Transkei and Ciskei 'independent' homelands which spearheaded the process. By implosion, I do not mean to denote a catastrophe of literally astrophysical proportions. I merely use the word to imply comparison with the physical process whereby a weakness at the centre is unable to support the outer facade of a structure and results in its inward collapse. The weakness at the centre may be found in the disjuncture between the homeland leadership and the homeland bourgeoisie, who might have constituted their local class base. I will return to this subject in my conclusion.
X: Transkei -From Matanzima to Holomisa

The Last Days of the Matanzimas
The Transkei was the first black homeland to receive "self- There is a considerable literature on Transkei during the reign of Kaiser Matanzima (1963 Matanzima ( -1986 . The most comprehensive treatment is Southall, South Africa's Transkei. 1989 , and the political repression was so severe that it was the only part of South Africa where the United Democratic Front was unable to establish itself. Above all, Transkei (and South Africa) possessed in the person of Prime Minister (later President) Kaiser Matanzima a true believer in the policy of territorial apartheid, a man who once declared that "Dr Verwoerd was sent by God to liberate the black people of South Africa." 10 The geographical isolation of Transkei, its rural character, its economic backwardness, and the greed and prosperity of its educated elite, all combined to create a climate where Transkei independence seemed a great deal more than a bad joke.
The wheels began to come off in February 1986, when Kaiser colleagues. Yet once in office she proceeded to take a number of stands that deeply disturbed not only Kaiser Matanzima, but the " uth African government as well. She made statements to the effect at the "independence" of Transkei was not irreversible. When she went overseas, she declined to read the speech that had been But her most fatal decision was to detain Kaiser Matanzima, who had started to bombard the press and the security police with calls for the overthrow of the "Communistic" Transkei government.
Matanzima was soon released from detention "for health reasons," and went to Bloemf ontein to recuperate. It is said that he planned the next coup from his hospital bed, with the assistance of high South African officials. On 30 December 1987, the TDF declared 16 Weekly Mail, 8 May, 25 Sept. 1987; Daily Dispatch, 9,16 May, 25 Sept, 6 Oct.1987 The Bantustan leaders, often seen as puppets by the liberation forces, have secured support-bases from various social groups that have emerged within whitecreated institutions. These groups have something to show for their gains: wealth, position, status and authority. To them, it is inconsequential that the status they enjoy is confined to their own circles. They will resist all attempts by the liberation movements to change the status quo.
Though Southall is more guarded ("the mere creation of a black middle class does not in itself guarantee that such an element will be non-revolutionary,") he concedes that:
The extreme degree of economic dependence of Transkei upon the South African government will continue to ensure that the core of the petty-bourgeoisie will be tied to the white regime -and such a course is likely to promote a widening polarization between the collaborationists and the Transkeian mass.
The behaviour of the middle classes during the crisis of the Duli coup shows that they do not conform to the expectations of these analysts. Despite all appearances to the contrary, the putative homeland alliance between the South African state and the collaborationist bourgeoisie was just as devoid of existence in " Innes and O'Meara, "Class Formation," p.80. Innes and O'Meara do emphasise that "only a small proportion of the petty bourgeois agents in the region" can be accomodated in the alliance with the South African state. Their prediction that a "very small class" of capitalist farmers" would eventually emerge as a significant element in Transkei has not been borne out by subsequent events. It is symptomatic of the conceptual confusion in homeland studies that Southall, the most detailed of all the homeland analysts, discusses the chiefs under the heading, "the Transkeian bourgeoisie; chiefs and politicians." South Africa * s Transkei, p.173.
Chiefs in the South African homelands, as elsewhere in Africa during the colonial period, have long depended on the government rather than their people for both political recognition and financial support. They can not be regarded as a 'traditional * ruling class because they have entirely ceased to represent the dominated remnants of the precolonial social order, although this fact has been deliberately obscured for ideological purposes. In South Africa, it is even questionable whether chiefs can be viewed as a social class at all, or whether they should simply be categorised as state functionaries like magistrates and policemen. To say that the homeland leaders are part of the South African state apparatus is not to imply that they are mere puppets or that they form part of a bureaucratic command structure. Such overt subordination to the white government would have destroyed the ideological legitimacy which the entire homeland system was geared to create. Homeland administrations therefore adopted a patrimonial style, patrimonialism being defined by Weber as "any kind of government that is organised as a more or less direct extension of 61 The four homelands of the Eastern Transvaal -Lebowa, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele and possibly Gazankulu -seem to be an exception to this generalisation. 
